This paper studies the impact of debt governance on …rms' risk shifting behavior. We construct …rm-level debt governance indices using corporate bond indenture provisions, and a market-based risk shifting measure estimated using a contingent-claim framework. We …rst document that …rms with strong debt governance subsequently lower business risk relative to their industry peers, and this relationship mainly exists among …rms with high default probability. Further evidence suggests that debt governance plays an important role in mitigating the impact of managerial risk-taking incentives on risk shifting. Higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) is signi…cantly positively related to risk shifting, but this e¤ect is signi…cantly weakened when strong debt governance is in place. Also, bondholders appear to bene…t from the impact of debt governance on risk shifting. Higher Vega is associated with higher credit spreads for bonds under weak debt governance. Under strong debt governance, higher Vega is associated with signi…cantly lower credit spreads.
Introduction
The economics of risk shifting (or asset substitution) has long been established in the …nance literature.
1 With limited liability, equityholders of a levered …rm have incentives to increase the …rm's risk once the debt is in place. Debtholders use covenants as the governance mechanism to protect their investments from various types of shareholder-debtholder agency con ‡icts. For example, Smith & Warner (1979) discuss covenants as addressing four categories of con ‡icts -dividend payment, claim dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment. 2 This study investigates the impact of debt governance on the …rm's risk taking behavior. We ask three questions: What is the relationship between debt governance and the …rm's risk-shifting behavior? What is the role of debt governance in mitigating the impact of managerial risk-taking incentives on the …rm risk? What implication does our study have for the design of corporate governance? The literature has been inconclusive about the importance of the risk shifting problem. For example, although Black & Scholes (1973) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) theoretically illustrate the potential con ‡icts between equityholders and debtholders, Leland (1998) derives a contingentclaim framework to …nd that the importance of the risk shifting problem is small. Although the relevance of risk shifting behavior in the …nancial industry is well recognized both theoretically and empirically, 3 Parrino & Weisbach (1999) conduct a numerical study and conclude that the empirical evidence of risk shifting behavior among industrial …rms is limited. Recently, Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) have used a market-based methodology to estimate …rms' total asset risk and report strong evidence of risk shifting behavior among industrial …rms. With respect to our …rst question, the literature has remained largely silent. This paper presents the …rst systematic evidence on the impact of debt governance on …rms' risk-taking behavior. First, we document a signi…cant negative relation between risk shifting and debt governance. Our empirical model estimates that increasing the debt governance proxies from minimum to maximum level is associated with a reduction in the …rm's industry-adjusted asset risk of up to 25% of the level in previous periods. To conduct the analysis, we construct two …rm-level debt governance proxies, based on the corporate bond issue-level covenant indices developed in Wei (2006) . To measure risk shifting relative to industry peers, we follow the market-based approach adopted in Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) .
We further investigate the impact of debt governance on risk shifting when …rms are close to …nancial distress. Theories predict that risk shifting is more likely when default likelihood is high, and therefore debt governance should play a more important role under such situations. We use two proxies for high default probabilities -a direct estimate of default probability as inferred from 1 Seminal work on this topic includes Jensen & Meckling (1976) , and Smith & Warner (1979) in the agency literature, and Black & Scholes (1973) , Merton (1974) and Galai & Masulis (1976) in the option pricing literature. 2 The contracting technology later evolved to include another type of con ‡ict -event risk (e.g., Crabbe (1991) ).
3 See John, Saunders & Senbet (2000) for a theory related to risk shifting in …nancial institutions. Also, see Esty (1997a) for empirical evidence from the savings and loan industry.
the Merton (1974) model 4 using Moody's KMV algorithm and an indicator of whether the …rm is rated speculative. Analysis using either proxy …nds strong evidence that debt governance plays a more signi…cant role in controlling the …rm's risk shifting behavior among …rms close to …nancial distress. For example, we …nd that debt governance plays virtually no role in restricting risk shifting when …rms have relatively low default risk or are rated investment-grade. Among …rms with high default probabilities (or a speculative-grade rating), however, strong debt governance is associated with 25% (or 27%) reduction in industry-adjusted asset risk ratio.
With respect to our second question, i.e., the managerial incentives behind the risk shifting problem, we investigate how debt governance interacts with managerial risk-taking incentives in a¤ecting the …rm's asset risk and the bond prices. 5 There is an ongoing theoretical debate on whether option-based compensation will incentivize risk-averse managers to make more risky decisions. 6 Empirically, a number of studies report a positive relation between the …rm's stock volatility and the value and risk incentives embedded in executives' compensation package. 7 In particular, recent …ndings by Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2006) suggest that high risk-taking incentives result in riskier investment and …nancing decisions. Moreover, bondholders seem to be concerned with such incentives. For example, Daniel, Martin & Naveen (2004) …nd a signi…cantly positive relationship between the credit spreads and the risk-taking incentives of the issuer's CEO compensation. Rating agencies also make statements expressing such concerns: "Since incentive compensation is intended to align manager incentives with stockholder interests, it is reasonable to expect that higher levels of incentive pay (at least based on shareholder-oriented metrics) would be correlated with greater credit risk." (Moody's (2005) ).
Using the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) as a measure of managerial risktaking incentives, we further …nd that strong debt governance signi…cantly mitigates the impact of Vega on risk-increasing decision making. Without strong debt governance, high Vega increases the industry-adjusted asset risk ratio (IRAR) by 7 percentage points, compared to …rms with low Vega. With strong debt governance, such impact is reduced to 1 percentage point.
Finally, we …nd that the impact of Vega on the credit spreads of the …rms' public bonds is a function of the strength of …rm-level debt governance. Consistent with Daniel et al. (2004) , we …nd that on average credit spreads increase with Vega. By interacting Vega with debt governance proxy, however, we …nd constrasting e¤ect of Vega on credit spreads, depending on the strength of debt governance. Speci…cally, credit spreads increase with Vega when debt governance is weak, but 4 See Section 5 for a discussion of using the Leland & Toft (1996) model as an alternative approach to estimate asset risk and default probability. 5 The Anglo-Saxon view of corporate governance has mainly focused on maximizing shareholder value via enhancing transparency and strengthening shareholder rights. See Tirole (2001) for a more balanced "stakeholder" perspective. For a comprehensive survey of corporate governance, see Shleifer & Vishny (1997) . 6 Early papers that suggest option-based compensation as solution to incentivize risk-averse CEOs include, e.g., Haugen & Senbet (1981) , and Amihud & Lev (1981) , etc. Recent theories questioning the earlier argument include, e.x., Ross (2004) . Section 2 contains a more detailed discussion. 7 Examples include Guay (1999) , Cohen, Hall & Viceira (2000) , etc. Section 2 contains a more detailed discussion.
decrease with Vega when strong debt governance is in place. The di¤erence due to debt governance is estimated to be as high as 266 basis points per one-million dollar increase in Vega. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and the estimation method to compute the unobservable asset risk. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 discusses several robustness issues and Section 6 concludes.
Related literature and hypothesis
Even three decades after the work by Galai & Masulis (1976) , Jensen & Meckling (1976) , and Myers (1977) analysts, investors, and researchers still examine the con ‡icts of interest between bondholders and equityholders in levered …rms. 8 The contigent claim approach by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) is a common way to describe the agency problem, where equity is viewed as a residual claim on the …rm's assets after all debt obligations are met and is increasing in the underlying asset risk. 9 Furthermore, the fact that levered equityholders have limited liability and unlimited upside potential provides incentives to increase …rm risk by investing in risky positive or even negative net-present-value projects. This risk shifting or asset substitution strategy increases the default risk and extracts wealth from bondholders to equityholders. The potential risk shifting problem is examined in two recent empirical studies by Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) , where asset risk is inferred using Moody's KMV algorithm in a contingent claim approach. Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) examine the relation between risk shifting and the …rms'default risk and …nd that …rms with high default risk are more likely to increase ex post asset risk, suggesting that managers act in the interest of the equityholders when the …rms are in …nancial distress.
Both papers ignore, however, the con ‡icts of interest between managers and stockholders and how this may in ‡uence the risk shifting behavior. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Holmström (1979) show that manager-stockholder con ‡icts are reduced by relating managerial compensation to …rm performance, and Haugen & Senbet (1981) point out that option-based compensation mitigates the risk-averse manager's reluctance to take risky investment projects (see also e.g., Amihud & Lev (1981) , Smith & Stulz (1985) , Lambert (1986) , Hirshleifer & Suh (1992) , and May (1995) ). Recent analytical studies show, however, that managerial risk-taking incentives from option-based 8 Other papers investigating the stockholder-bondholder con ‡icts are Smith & Warner (1979) , Barnea, Haugen & Senbet (1980) , Gavish & Kalay (1983) , Leland (1998) , Parrino & Weisbach (1999) , Childs, Mauer & Ott (2005) among others. 9 The Merton (1974) model is extended in several ways to weaken some of the restrictive assumptions made in the original model by Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) . Black & Cox (1976) allow for default before debt maturity by introducing a constant lower boundary, and Longsta¤ & Schwartz (1995) model a more complex debt structure. Tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs were introduced by Leland (1994) and re…ned in Leland & Toft (1996). compensation are highly sensitive to certain characteristics of the compensation scheme. When analyzing the risk-averse and undiversi…ed manager's risk incentives in a utility-based model, Lambert, Larcker & Verrecchia (1991 ), Carpenter (2000 , and Hjortshøj (2006) show that the risk-taking incentives are sensitive to option characteristics such as the option's moneyness, the managers' outside wealth, and the size of the other components of the total compensation scheme.
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The managers'and equityholders'risk-shifting incentives are likely to increase the …rms'credit risk and lower the wealth of the bondholders. Jensen & Meckling (1976) , Myers (1977) , and Smith & Warner (1979) suggest that including bond covenants in the bond contracts mitigates the bondholder-equityholder con ‡icts and reduce the default risks. Wei (2006) reviews this literature with an in-depth description of the di¤erent covenant protections and how these could restrict the manager's decisions. 11 The common objective of the di¤erent bond covenant types observed in the US market is to constrain ex post managerial decisions in order to reduce the bondholderequityholder con ‡icts. Theories recognize the cost-bene…t tradeo¤ in choosing covenants. On one hand, with the covenant protection written in the contract, bondholders lower the premium they require for their investment. On the other hand, restrictive covenants might impose costs on the …rm if the restrictions limit the …rm's operating ‡exibility to pursue growth opportunities.
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Furthermore, Berkovitch & Kim (1990) point out that, under certain circumstances, restrictions solving under-investment problem might create incentive for excessive investment and vice versa. These trade-o¤s are generally summarized under the "Costly Contracting Hypothesis". The empirical literature on debt covenants has been centered on the "Costly Contracting Hypothesis". Researchers typically focus on the issuance time and examine factors that a¤ect the ex ante covenant choices. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, …rms are more likely to include restrictive covenants in their debt if they face higher shareholder-bondholder con ‡icts (e.g., Malitz (1986) and Begley & Feltham (1999) ). On the costs of covenants, several studies report a negative relationship between growth opportunities and the covenant inclusion for public bond issues. 13 Billet, King & Mauer (2006) , however, apply a simultaneous-equation framework to …nd a strong positive relation between covenant intensity and growth opportunity. Similarly, Bradley & Roberts (2004) observe a positive relation between growth opportunities and covenant inclusion in private 1 0 Other papers examining the risk incentives in a utility-based framework are Hall & Murphy (2002) , Ju, Leland & Senbet (2002) , Johnson & Tian (2004) , Nohel & Todd (2004) , Ross (2004) , Brisley (2006) , and Lewellen (2006) 1 1 Smith & Warner (1979) describe the Production/Investment, Dividend, Financing and Bonding Covenants. Crabbe (1991) presents the Event-Risk Covenants such as poison put and super poison puts, while Bhanot & Mello (2006) describe the "Rating Trigger" Covenant.
1 2 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling (1976) , Smith & Warner (1979) and Berlin & Mester (1992) . For models that focus on speci…c types of covenants see Myers (1977) on dividend covenants as a solution to the underinvestment problem, John & Kalay (1982) , who model the cost-bene…t tradeo¤ associated with the dividends payout covenant constraints. More recently, Bhanot & Mello (2006) examine the the cost-bene…t tradeo¤ in choosing "rating trigger clause" (rating decline covenant).
1 3 See, e.g., Kahen & Yermack (1998 ), Nash, Netter & Poulsen (2003 , Goyal (2005) ). A further interesting …nding by Kahen & Yermack (1998) is that convertibility seems to subsitute for covenants when …rms face high growth opportunities. debt contracts.
Studies examining manager's remuneration package …nd a positive relation between …rm's stock return volatility and the convexity of the total compensation scheme (e.g., Guay (1999) , Cohen et al. (2000) , and Rajgopal & Shevlin (2002) ). Guay (1999) and Coles et al. (2006) …nd that R&D intensity and growth opportunities have a positive association with the option's risk incentives and Cohen et al. (2000) and Coles et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence of a positive relation between risk incentives and …rm leverage. Furthermore, DeFusco, Johnson & Zorn (1990) and Hjortshøj (2006) …nd that option grants have a positive impact on both stock risk and leverage. In addition, Hjortshøj (2006) applies Moody's KMV method to compute the asset risk and …nds positive risk shifting in asset risk after stock option grants.
Also analysts in rating agencies such as FitchRatings, Moody's and Standard & Poor's have expressed concern about the impact from managerial option-based compensation on the …rm's credit quality (see, e.g., FitchRatings (2004) , Standard & Poor's (2004) , and Moody's (2005) 14 Executive pay arrangements that provide large short-term incentives -particularly those related to equity valuations, which can be volatile and erratic -may pose excessive risk, particularly from a creditor standpoint.
In sum, following the arguments outlined above we have reasons to believe that managers with a signi…cant part of their total wealth related to the overall …rm performance are more willing to make highly risky investments to increase their own expected future gain of the option component. We therefore predict that risk shifting behavior is positively related to executives' risk-taking incentives of option-based compensation. In addition, we expect that high default risk as well as high managerial stock option risk incentives result in greatest risk shifting.
The last branch of literature that is relevant concerns the design of the corporate governance system. To focus on the role of covenants in mitigating the shareholder-bondholder con ‡icts, Smith & Warner (1979) start by assuming that managers are perfectly aligned with shareholders, and conclude by recognizing that di¤erent agency con ‡icts should not be viewed in isolation. The Anglo-Saxon view of the corporate governance, on the other hand, focuses on the shareholdermanager con ‡icts. 15 Recent evidence suggests that some corporate governance mechanisms viewed favorably by shareholders raises the concerns of creditors. 16 Although a "stakeholder" perspective has been advocated in the literature (see, e.g., John & Senbet (1998) on board e¤ectiveness, Tirole (2001) on a unifying framework), explicit considerations of stockholder-bondholder con ‡icts in the 1 4 The article is available on www.moodys.com 1 5 For a comprehensive survey of this subject, see Shleifer & Vishny (1997) . 1 6 See, e.g., Chava, Dierker, Livdan & Purnanandam (2007) on the relationship between the G index developed in Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) and the cost of bank debt. Klock, Mansi & Maxwell (2005) relate G to bondholder prices and show a higher cost of debt with higher shareholder rights. Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) study how the existence of institutional investors and outside directors is related to the cost of debt. Cremers, Nair & Wei (2007) study the interaction between the existence of a blockholder and the level of anti-takeover protection in the …rm's charter provisions. They document that the two mechanisms complement each other in increasing the e¤ective takeover vulnerability of the issuer, and thus increase the cost of debt. corporate governance literature are rare. 17 Empirically, the evidence suggests that bondholders are concerned about the higher managerial incentives provided by the managerial compensation. Di¤erent studies …nd consistent evidence using di¤erent measures of managerial incentives and di¤erent methodologies. 18 Most relevant to our analysis is Daniel et al. (2004) , who document a positive relationship between the credit spreads and the Delta and Vega of CEOs'total portfolio of stock and options.
Data and Construction of the Proxies
In this section, we describe the data sources and measure construction, which can be separated into six categories -data for (1) risk shifting, (2) default risk, (3) debt governance, (4) managerial incentives, (5) bond prices and rating and (6) …rm characteristics. Following Fang & Zhong (2004) , Vassalou & Xing (2004) , and Larsen (2006) we exclude …nancial …rms, utilities, and all equity …rms. 
Asset risk and industry-adjusted risk adjustment ratios
In the recent credit risk literature, Moody's KMV method, described by Crosbie & Bohn (2003) , has become a popular iterative algorithm for estimating the unobserved asset risk. We follow the implementation of Moody's KMV method by Vassalou & Xing (2004) , where the equity is modeled as a Merton (1974) European call option on the …rm's assets. 20 The face value of the …rm's debt (the strike price) is de…ned as the current liabilities plus half the long-term debt, and the debt maturity is assumed to be one year. 21 , 22 The daily market values of equity are computed as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price or the bid/ask average. We choose the risk-free interest rate as the constant maturity 1-year Treasury Bill rate and for the asset payout rate we follow Huang & Huang (2003) and use 6 percent. We use equity prices of the past 12 months from CRSP to calculate an initial guess of the asset 1 7 One exception is John & John (1993) , who are the …rst to consider risk-shifting incentives in the design of an optimal managerial compensation structure. 1 8 For example, DeFusco et al. (1990) and Hjortshøj (2006) study the announcement e¤ect of new option grants. Bagnani, Milonas, Saunders & Travlos (1994) study the relation between bond return premium and managerial ownership using a regression approach.
1 9 Financial …rms and utilities are generally considered as tightly regulated and this may result in a risk shifting behavior unrelated to the bondholder-equityholder con ‡icts.
2 0 Crouhy, Galai & Mark (2000) , Bharath & Shumway (2004) , Duan, Gauthier & Simonato (2004) , Fang & Zhong (2004) , Reisz & Perlich (2004) , Sundaram & Yermack (2005) , and Larsen (2006) all implement Moody's KMV algorithm in a similar way as Vassalou & Xing (2004) .
2 1 A more detailed description of the Merton (1973) model is given in Appendix A. 2 2 We follow Larsen (2006) and use COMPUSTAT …nancial data from the end of the previous …nancial year as our current year measure of debt. The current liabilities include the total amount of short-term notes and the current portion of long-term debt that matures in one year. Fang & Zhong (2004) and Vassalou & Xing (2004) …nd that their results are robust for other choices of weights on the long-term debt.
volatility and apply the iterative algorithm to compute daily asset values. In order to have su¢ cient liquidity in the market prices of equity we require at least 100 daily equity prices per calendar year. Those computed asset values allow us to calculate a new estimate of the asset volatility, which we use as the input parameter in the next iteration. The algorithm is repeated until we obtain convergence of asset volatility estimates from two consecutive iterations. 23 We …x outliers by winsorizing the equity volatilities, the asset volatilities, and the drift at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In order to examine the ex post unanticipated risk shifting we follow Skinner (1989) and Brown, Harlow & Starks (1996) and calculate a risk adjustment ratio RAR t = denote the current and the next year's asset volatility, respectively. To …lter out industry-wide factors we follow Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) and calculate an industry-adjusted risk adjustment ratio (IRAR t ), where we subtract the median RAR t of the …rms with the same 2-digit SIC coded industry and in the same year. Throughout the rest of our analysis we use IRAR t to examine the levered equityholder's risk taking behavior.
Default risk
According to Myers (1977) , …rms that are in …nancial distress are most exposed to agency problems since the equityholders face limited downside but unlimited upside potential. In other words, when the …rm is on the verge of bankruptcy everything is to be gained and nothing lost.
Consistent with the existing literature, we use a market-based measure of the default probability based on Moody's KMV method. Competing accounting-based measures, such as the Z-Score derived by Altman (1968) and the O-Score derived by Ohlson (1980) , are shown to have less predictive power than the market-based measure in a recent study by Hillegeist, Keating, Gram & Lundstedt (2004) .
Based on the Merton (1974) model the default probability is the probability that the market value of assets, V , is less than the strike, X, (the current liabilities plus half the long-term debt) maturing in one year.
where V is the continuously compounded expected annual return on assets, V is the average historical payout rate, and T is the one year default horizon.
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As pointed out in Vassalou & Xing (2004) our proxy for default risk di¤ers from those inferred by Moody's KMV since we use a normal distribution whereas Moody's KMV uses an empirical distribution of defaults to compute the default probabilities.
By de…nition, DP t is a model-speci…c measure based on the Merton (1974) model, which uses equity market data as the model input. Alternatively, we can rely on the assessment of rating agencies to capture situations of high default probability. The advantage of using …rm credit rating assigned by rating agencies is that it re ‡ects the direct assessment of a company's default likelihood, based on credit-sensitive information processed by third parties. The main data source used for measuring debt governance is the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD). FISD contains issue details on over 140,000 Corporate, Corporate MTN (Medium Term Note), Supranational, U.S. Agency and U.S. Treasury debt securities. Among more than 550 data …elds, the FISD database provides detailed information on the bonds at the time of issuance, including o¤ering yield, o¤ering amount, coupon type/rate, maturity, callability and putability features etc. A unique feature of FISD is the comprehensive coverage of the bond indenture provisions. The sources for this information are bond prospectus, issuers'SEC …lings including 10-K, 8-K, registration forms, etc.
We focus on non-convertible bonds issued in the post-1990 period in which the coverage becomes comprehensive.
26 , 27 FISD provides data on the incidence of more than 40 covenants. For issue-level debt governance measures, we use the J and W indices developed by Wei (2006) . These two indices are constructed using 28 covenants grouped into the following …ve categories -Production/Investment (Investment), Dividend, Financing, Default-related (Default) and Event-related (Event). 28 Brie ‡y, J is the total number of covenants in each contract (see, e.g., Gompers et al. (2003) ), and W captures the number of the categorization of con ‡icts addressed by covenants as in Smith & Warner (1979) . To develop a …rm-level aggregate measure of the strength of public debt governance, we weight the J or W index of each issue by its outstanding amount in each period, and compute a weighted average of J or W indices of all outstanding bonds,
2 5 We use rating data from both Moody's and S&P. When the two rating agencies'assessment don't agree, we take the average of the two. Mansi & Reeb (2002) suggest that using the average of both Moody's and S&P provides the most e¢ cient measure of the default risk premium. We apply their methodology in a slightly di¤erent context here.
2 6 For each issue, FISD provides an indicator on whether detailed covenant information is collected for that issue. For bonds issued in the post-1990 period, about half have missing covenant information and are therefore excluded from our study. Billet et al. (2006) …nd that whether a bond issue has covenant information is not a function of when a bond is issued during the year, the priority, rating or maturity of the bond, the size of the issue or the issuer, the exchange on which the issuer's stock trades.
2 7 Smith & Warner (1979) suggest, and Kahen & Yermack (1998) empirically con…rm, that the convertibility feature might substitute for covenant protection, especially when the issuer has good growth opportunities.
2 8 See Appendix B for descriptions of each provision. Wei(2006) gives detailed description on the construction of each measure.
where W t ij is the covenant index of …rm i's corporate debt issue j with the outstanding amount B ij at time t. We apply the same formula to the J covenant indices of the …rm's outstanding bonds, to reach an aggregate Cov_J t i : For measurement easiness, we also standardize the two indices using the sample standard deviation of each to reach two scaled measures -Scale_J t i and Scale_W t i . Appendix B provides a detailed description of the di¤erent covenant provisions.
One rationale behind using the outstanding amount as the weight is that it captures the relative easiness to remove the covenant restriction by retiring or restructuring the debt issue.
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Managerial Incentives
To measure CEO incentives, we follow recent literature (e.g., Coles et al. (2006) ) to construct two measures. Delta is the change in the dollar value of the executive's wealth for a one-percentage point change in stock price. Vega is the change in the dollar value of the executive's wealth for a change of one percentage point in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. The calculation follows Guay (1999) and Core & Guay (2002) , who use the Black-Scholes option valuation model. See Appendix C for a detailed description.
We use the Standard and Poor's Execucomp database for data on CEO compensation. Execucomp provides data on salary, bonus and total compensation for the top …ve executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) of …rms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 400, and S&P Smallcap 600, for the period 1993-2002.
Corporate Bond Prices and Bond Ratings
Data of secondary market prices of corporate bonds is not easily available. To maximize the sample size and therefore the power of the empirical tests, we collect corporate bond prices from three sources. Our …rst source is the Lehman Brothers' Bond Database (LBBD), which has been a major data source for corporate bond prices (yields) in previous bond pricing literature (see, e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal & Mann (2001) ). LBBD reports the institutional pricing for Treasury and corporate bonds. The dataset contains both matrix prices as well as dealer quotes, and we only use dealer quotes. 31 Finally, LBBD also provides information on some issue characteristics such as issue size, maturity, callability, seniority and credit ratings which we use as controls in our regression model in Section 4.3.2.
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We focus on bonds with Standard and Poor's and Moody's credit ratings between AA+ (Aa1) and B-(B3).
33 AAA (Aaa) bonds in both LBBD and NAIC datasets have appeared "problematic" in previous studies (see, e.g., Elton et al. (2001) ), and we follow the literature to exclude bond observations with AAA (Aaa) ratings. We also remove high yield bonds rated CCC+ (Caa1) or below, because there are not enough observations for bonds below CCC+, and there are potential problems that the prices of these bonds are more likely to contain errors due to infrequent trading/quoting. We keep speculative-grade bonds above B-(B3), however, because covenant incidence usually increases with the risk of the bonds, and it is important to keep reasonable variation in the covenant indices for the purpose of this study. To ensure that the high yield bond prices are representative of the market, we only focus on the month in which at least 10 bond transactions are observed among the insurers. We then pick the price of the transaction that is closest to the end of month. The risk-free term structure of interest rates is from the Salomon Brothers Yield Book, including the quarterly treasury benchmark yields with time-to-maturity of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20 and 30 years. To calculate the credit spreads of each observation, we match by time-to-maturity to get the corresponding Treasury benchmark yield and adjust the bond yield with the corresponding risk-free interest rates. We use linear interpolation to calculate Treasury yields with time-to-maturity of other years below 30. For the few observations with time-to-maturity of more than 30 years, we use the 30-year Treasury benchmark. For each observation, the spread is calculated as the di¤erence between the bond yield and its corresponding Treasury benchmark. The term structure of interest rate is also used to control the impact of the term structure in the credit spread regression.
Finally, when rating information is not available in LBBD or FISD, we use Moody's Default Research Data and S&P's CreditPro Database as additional sources of issue-and issuer-level rating histories.
Control variables
Consistent with Coles et al. (2006) we use Surplus Cash as a proxy for the amount of cash available, where free cash ‡ow is usually associated with relatively safe and mature …rms with low investment opportunities (see, e.g., Jensen (1986) ). We therefore expect a negative relation between Surplus Cash and risk taking.
Tangible assets are generally viewed as more reliable collateral for secured debt and helps in case of default. Begley & Chamberlain (2005) …nd a negative relation between tangible assets and the use of protective covenants and suggest that more tangible assets indicate lower likelihood of corporate default. Therefore, more tangible assets result in better creditor perspective on recovery, which suggests lower credit risk and risk taking incentives. Furthermore, more tangible assets usually mean more mature …rms with less growth opportunities and therefore less room for ex post risk taking. We expect a negative relation between Tangibility and risk taking. Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest that more growth opportunities may increase the overinvestment problems since high growth …rms are more likely to have risky investments left in their investment opportunity set. In addition, Kahen & Yermack (1998) and Nash et al. (2003) …nd that high growth …rms tend to include less restrictive covenants and argue that high growth …rms value their investment opportunities and investment decision ‡exibilities more (see also, e.g., Bradley & Roberts (2004) , and Goyal (2005)). We use Market-to-book ratio as a measure of investment opportunities and predict a positive relation between risk taking and Market-to-book ratio.
We also need to control for the leverage since Malitz (1986) and Bradley & Roberts (2004) …nd that …rms with more leverage use more restrictive covenants and Chava & Roberts (2006) report a negative relation between book leverage and investments. 34 We follow the measure of Book Leverage by Coles et al. (2006) and expect to …nd that higher leverage results in less risk taking. Finally, we follow Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) and control for Firm Size, and we use Asset Risk to capture the predicted inverse relation between IRARs and current asset volatility. Parrino & Weisbach (1999) emphasize that highly volatile …rms are more likely to have less risky projects left in their investment opportunity set. Nohel & Todd (2004) and Parrino, Poteshman & Weisbach (2005) argue that the managers may reduce …rm risk to lower the probability of …nancial distress and to safeguard the interests of their own career concerns. In addition, the mean-reversion in …rm risk could be another plausible explanation for the inverse relation between current asset volatility and risk shifting (e.g., Stein & Stein (1991) , and Heston (1993) ).
Appendix D provides a detailed description of the variable de…nitions.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we document (1) the impact of debt governance on …rms'risk shifting behavior and how this e¤ect depends on the …rm's default likelihood, and (2) how debt governance mitigates the impact of managerial risk-taking incentives on risk shifting and bondholder value. We start by presenting some summary statistics of the data. Panel A of Table 1 shows the distributional statistics of three key variables inferred from the Merton (1974) model using Moody's KMV algorithm -asset risk adjustment ratio (RAR), industry-adjusted RAR (IRAR) and modelimplied default probability (DP). Overall, we have 9770 …rm-year observations which have nonmissing data on risk measures, debt governance measures and control variables. On average, …rms increase their asset risk by 5% from the previous period. However, the sample median RAR indicates that more than half of the time …rms are reducing asset risk. For IRAR, the risk shifting activities of the …rms in our sample are on average above their industry median, but the sample median IRAR suggests the opposite. Our sample …rms have on average an estimated default probability of 5.7% and a much lower median DP of virtually zero. This is consistent with the fact that corporate bond issuers tend to be larger in size and less prone to default. Lastly, it is important to note that all three measures have reasonable variation in our sample.
Summary statistics of the debt governance measures are presented in Panel B. The …rm-level outstanding-amount-weighted Cov_J (Cov_W) index ranges from 0 to a maximum of 17.3 (5), with a mean of 6.04 (3.12) and a standard deviation of 3.31 (1.30). The standardized versions of the two are also presented.
Panel C presents the summary statistics of the risk-taking incentive -Vega, derived from the CEO's compensation package. For a one-percentage point increase in the company's stock volatility, there is an average of 146.5 thousand dollar increase in the CEO's compensation. This number is larger than what is reported in a recent study by Coles et al. (2006) , which focuses on the full universe of the Execucomp database. Again, the di¤erence might re ‡ect the fact that we are focusing on …rms that are large enough to have access to the public debt market. Lastly, summary statistics on the control variables are reported in Panel D.
[Insert Table 2 show the mean and median RARs and IRARs per calender year, along with number of companies in each period. We …rst notice that the mean and median RARs are comparable to those presented in studies by Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) . 35 The RAR measure stays stable in the early part of the 90's and then becomes volatile after 96. The pattern of IRAR shows that the risk shifting levels of our sample …rms are below their industry median level at both ends of the sample period, but stay above during the latter half of the 90s. In terms of debt governance, Panel C shows an upward trend in debt governance level in the 90s. The levels peaked around 1999 and then declined.
[Insert [Insert Figure 1 ] Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of IRAR, DP, Asset Risk, Scale_J, Scale_W and some …rm characteristics. The negative correlation between IRAR and Asset Risk is consistent with Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) . Not surprisingly, the two debt governance measures are highly correlated. The positive correlations between DP and the debt governance measures re ‡ect the fact that high yield debtholders choose stronger governance by including more covenants, due to the much higher default likelihood. With respect to the correlation between the key variables and the …rm characteristics, the results are generally consistent with …ndings in recent studies such as Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) . We now proceed to report the main empirical analysis using regression framework.
[Insert Table 3 ] 
Risk Taking and Debt Governance
We …rst document the impact of debt governance on …rms'risk shifting behavior. In the regression analysis that follows, we implement the Fama & MacBeth (1973) approach by running annual crosssectional regressions and report the time-series averages of the parameter estimates. Consistent with Jin, Merton & Bodie (2006) we correct the time-series standard errors for serial correlation by using the procedures in Ponti¤ (1996) and Abarbanell & Bernard (2000) . 36 Table 4 reports the results from the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regression of annual risk shifting measure IRAR on debt governance variables Scale_J and Scale_W plus the …rm-speci…c control variables. In each annual cross-section regression, we control for Surplus Cash, Tangibility, Marketto-book ratio, Book Leverage, Firm Size (log of asset) and Asset Risk. 37 Coe¢ cient estimates on control variables are generally consistent with recent studies. Regarding the debt governance proxies, Model 1 and 2 show that both Scale_J and Scale_W have strongly negative and signi…cant coe¢ cients, equal to -0.25 with a t-stat of -2.86 for Scale_J, and -0.17 with a t-stat of -2.52 for Scale_W. These results show that the presence of strong debt governance is associated with signi…cant reduction in the asset risk, as measured by IRAR.
3 6 Ponti¤ (1996) and Abarbanell & Bernard (2000) adjust the time-series standard errors for serial correlation by modeling the residuals as an autoregressive process. In our empirical analysis we regress the time-series of the parameter estimates on an intercept term and model the residuals as a …rst-order autoregressive process. We …nd that the adjusted standard errors are identical to the unadjusted standard errors since the empirical estimates on the …rst-order autocorrelation term is statistically insigni…cant.
3 7 See Appendix D for a detailed de…nition and a description of the data used for computation.
[Insert Table 4] The observed e¤ects are also economically important. For example, moving from the minimum (0) to the maximum (1) level in the debt governance index Scale_J (Scale_W), the associated reduction in asset risk ratio t+1 V = t V , is 25% (17%) relative to the …rm's industry median. We further investigate how nonlinearity could a¤ect our results. Since we use noisy measures of debt governance, imposing a linear relationship between the estimated risk shifting measure and the debt governance proxies might be improper. In Model 3 and 4, we specify a piece-wise linear relationship using quartile dummies for Cov_J and Cov_W. The results indeed suggest a non-linear relationship. For example, relative to the lowest level (quartile 1) of debt governance, the impact of debt governance becomes signi…cantly di¤erent only when the Cov_J or Cov_W is above the sample median. In Model 3, everything else being equal, moving from the lower two quartiles of the Scale_J index value to the upper two quartiles results in an 8% reduction in IRAR. Model 4 using Scale_W yields statistically and economically similar results.
Results in Table 3 con…rm a strong negative relationship between risk shifting and debt governance. However, the evidence is consistent with at least two competing explanations. Financial contracting theories predict a causal relationship where strong debt governance (covenant restriction) restrict the manager from making risky decisions that result in a transfer of wealth from senior claimholders to the equityholder. Alternatively, risk level and contracting are both endogenous variables which can be driven by some unobserved factors. To …nd further support for a causal relationship, we next investigate situations where risk shifting is predicted to be severe.
Risk Taking, Default Risk and Debt Governance
In this section, we explore the nature of debt governance's impact on risk shifting, by conditioning on whether the …rm is close to …nancial distress. We use two proxies for closeness to …nancial distress -model-implied default probability (DP) and …rm credit rating. Since …rms close to …nancial distress are more likely to engage in risk shifting, we expect strong debt governance to play a more signi…cant role when default probability is high. Table 5 presents results using DP. We sort …rms into quartiles with respect to their default probability DP, and de…ne a "high" DP dummy, DP_quar4, for the upper quartile group. We also independently sort …rms into two groups according to the strength of debt governance (strong and weak), and de…ne a dummy Cov_J_h (Cov_W_h) for the …rms with strong Cov_J (Cov_W). We regress IRAR on DP_quar4, Cov_J_h (or Cov_W_h), an interaction term of the two, and controls for …rm characteristics. The estimate for DP_quar4 is 0.20 in both Model 1 and Model 2. Although the economic magnitude of these estimates are comparable to recent …ndings in Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) , neither is statistically signi…cant. However, we obtain estimation results of economic and statictical signi…cance that are comparable to Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) , when the regression is applied to the full COMPUSTAT-CRSP universe. A possible reason for the di¤erence is that our sample of corporate bond issuers tend to be populated with large, mature and hence safer …rms, resulting in less variation in DP. The interaction term between dummies for high DP and high debt governance is strongly negative for both debt governance measures, having point estimates of -0.25 with t-stat of -2.09 in Model 1 (DP_quar4*Cov_J_h) and -0.25 with t-stat of -2.06 in Model 2 (DP_quar4*Cov_W_h). Lastly, the coe¢ cient estimates for Cov_J_h and Cov_W_h have the expected signs but are statistically insigni…cant. The results suggest that, although strong debt governance on average does not signi…cantly a¤ect risk shifting when default probability is high, the risk shifting is signi…cantly reduced in the presence of strong debt governance. The economic magnitude of the results seems meaningful. Both models suggest that, for a "high default probability" …rm, strong debt governance is associated with a 25% reduction in risk shifting measure IRAR, as compared to either default-prone …rms with weak debt governance, or …rms that are default-remote.
[Insert Table 5 ] Table 6 presents corroborating evidence using credit rating as alternative measures for default likelihood. Following Section 4.1, we apply the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regression in two subsamples -…rms that are rated investment and …rms that are rated speculative grade by the rating agencies. By de…nition, the latter case corresponds to …rms that have distinctly higher default probability and therefore are more likely to engage in risk shifting activities.
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 6 shows that the impact of debt governance is indeed more signi…cant among speculativegrade …rms. In fact, neither debt governance measure has signi…cant coe¢ cient estimate in any of the regressions applied to investment-grade …rms (Panel A). On the contrary, Panel B shows that the coe¢ cient estimate for Scale_J is -0.27 with a t-stat of -2.10 in Model 3, and the coe¢ cient estimate for Scale_W is -0.20 with a t-stat of -2.20 in Model 4. Among speculative-grade …rms, the reduction in risk shifting due to debt governance is estimated to be (1-0)*(-0.27) = -27% using the Scale_J index, and (1-0)*(-0.20) = -20% using the Scale_W index.
Recent evidence in Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) shows that, consistent with the agency theories, risk shifting (measured by IRAR) behavior is most prominent among …rms with high default probabilities. Results in this section echo this evidence in that debt governance exerts signi…cant control on …rms'risk shifting behavior, precisely under the situations in which this agency con ‡icts are predicted to be most severe.
Managerial Incentives and Debt Governance
In this section, we consider the managerial incentives behind the risk shifting problem. Recent evidence by Coles et al. (2006) indicates that higher CEO risk-taking incentives (measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility, Vega) give executives incentives to engage in more risky corporate policies. Moreover, this e¤ect seems to be re ‡ected in the value of debtholders'investment as well. Daniel et al. (2004) report that higher Vega on average is associated with signi…cantly higher credit spreads, re ‡ecting concerns of the bond investors. In this section, we investigate the role of debt governance in mitigating the aforementioned e¤ects due to high managerial risk-taking incentives, by interacting debt governance and the CEO Vega measure in the regression framework. is signi…cantly positively associated with risk shifting. Model 2 and 3 investigate the interaction between debt governance and Vega. Model 2 shows that, when Vega is high, strong debt governance signi…cantly mitigate the overall impact of the risk-taking incentives on risk shifting measure IRAR. For example, for …rms with weak debt governance, moving from low Vega to high Vega is associated with 7 percentage point increase in the industry-adjusted asset risk ratio. In the presence of strong debt governance, however, increasing Vega from low to high level is only associated with a 1 percentage point increase in IRAR. Interestingly, Model 3 shows that, when using Cov_W_h to proxy for debt governance, its interaction with Vega becomes insigni…cant, although the economic magnitude remains similar to that of Model 2. This result highlights the di¤erent aspects of debt governance captured by the Cov_J and Cov_W indices. While the former measures the covenant intensity by the weighted average number of covenant provisions in the public debt structure, the latter measures the strength of debt governance in terms of weighted number of categorization of con ‡icts addressed by the covenants. Perhaps, the categorization is imperfect and the covenant intensity with each category might be more important than the number of con ‡ict categories. We leave this question for future exploration and end this section with the conclusion that the evidence suggests that debt governance plays an important role in mitigating the impact of managerial risk-taking incentives on …rms'risk shifting behavior.
Risk Shifting, Managerial Incentives and Debt Governance
[Insert Table 7] 
Credit Spreads, Managerial Incentives and Debt Governance
If debt governance e¤ectively restricts risk shifting decisions by incentivized CEOs, bondholders would be the …rst bene…ciary group, which should be re ‡ected in market prices. In this section, we directly test this implication by analyzing how managerial incentives and debt governance interact to a¤ect the credit spreads.
The regression framework follows that of Daniel et al. (2004) , with two additional explanatory variables -debt governance index Cov_J (or Cov_W) and the interaction between Cov_J (or Cov_W) and Vega. We control …rm characteristics including Firm Size, Market-to-Book, lagged stock return, stock volatility, ROA, leverage, interest coverage, and issue characteristics including coupon, time to maturity, issue size, and callability. Lastly, we control for credit ratings using rating dummies for the …nest rating classi…cation.
We …rst present summary statistics of the variables, in Panel A of Table 8 . After merging the datasets of bond price, debt governance indices and managerial incentives, our …nal sample contains more than 29,000 bond months with on average more than 150 …rms per month. The mean (median) Delta is 0.44(0.19) million dollars with a standard deviation of 0.77 million dollars, and the mean (median) Vega is 0.08(0.05) million dollars with a standard deviation of 0.09 million dollars. Debt governance measure Cov_J (Cov_W) has a mean level of 4.6 (2.4) with a maximum of 14 (5). Controls for …rm characteristics (e.g., Market size and leverage) are again representative of large …rms. The average time to maturity of the bonds is 13.8 years and the average coupon is 8.2%. Lastly, about 25% of the bond months represent callable bonds, and 10% of the bond observations have a speculative credit rating.
Panel B in Table 8 Daniel et al. (2004) . Delta and Vega are both signi…cantly positively associated with credit spreads. A one-million dollar increase in Vega (Delta) is associated with an increase of 26 (1) basis points in credit spreads. In Model 2, the impact of Vega on credit spreads is decomposed into two parts -the Vega term having a coe¢ cient estimate of 0.97 with a t-stat of 7.01, and the Vega*Cov_J interaction term having a coe¢ cient estimate of -0.19 with a t-stat of -5.69. These results suggest a contrasting e¤ect of managerial risk taking incentives on credit spreads, depending on the strength of debt governance. For example, for issuer with weak debt governance (Cov_J=0), a one-million dollar increase in Vega is associated with an increase of 97 + 0*1 = 97 basis points in credit spreads. With the maximum level of debt governance (Cov_J=14) in place, however, the combined e¤ect is 97+(-19)*14 = -169 basis points. Overall, depending on the strength of debt governance, the di¤erence in the impact of changing Vega by one million dollar on credit spreads, can be as large as 97 -(-169) = 266 basis points. Model 3 delivers similar message using debt governance index Cov_W. Both Model 2 and 3 suggest that the coexistence of strong debt governance and strong managerial risk-taking incentives are viewed positively by the bondholders. Strong managerial risk-taking incentives without the protection from strong debt governance, however, is not priced favorably in the bond market.
[Insert Table 8] Agency theories predict that higher managerial incentives could be good or bad news for bondholders. Because of the shareholder-bondholder agency con ‡ict, bondholders require covenants in the bond indenture to protect them from opportunistic behavior of the manager who is on the shareholders'side. Theories predict that, with e¤ective protection, the bene…cial side of managerial incentives, i.e., to accept positive NPV projects, should be re ‡ected in higher bond prices. Results presented in Table 8 are consistent with this view. From the bondholders'perspective, high managerial incentives and strong covenant protection work as complements. 40 From the perspective of …rm value maximization, results in this section further suggest that the complementarity results might also apply to the …rm as a whole. In particular, to the extent that higher Vega increases the …rm's risk taking, as recently documented in Coles et al. (2006) , our …ndings suggest that debt governance might help mitigate the risk shifting component in CEO risk-taking incentives. However, the implications of our results for the …rm value are at best indirect, and we leave this issue for future research.
Robustness Checks
The analysis discussed so far employs a variant of the method of Fama & MacBeth (1973) . A logical alternative is a panel setup with …rm …xed e¤ect and time-varying coe¢ cients. However, due to the relative stableness of our debt governance measures, using …rm …xed e¤ect will force the identi…cation of the debt governance coe¢ cients from those few cases of within-…rm changes through time. On the other hand, as pointed out by Gompers et al. (2003) , Fama & MacBeth (1973) method essentially assumes a …xed …rm e¤ect linear in the debt governance measure. To eliminate concerns that the results are sensitive to this assumption, we also conduct panel regression with year and industry e¤ects, to all the empirical tests. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request. Secondly, the risk shifting measures are market-based estimates derived from Merton (1974) , which itself could be criticized for not incorporating a number of more realistic factors. In the Merton (1974) framework, the …rm has one issue of zero-coupon bond. At maturity of the bond, equityholders will either pay bondholders the face value of the bond or declare bankruptcy and leave the remaining assets to the bondholders. This very simple model has lead to several theoretical extensions that account for more realistic capital structure and allow for intermediate default, among other things. 41 In order to examine the risk adjustment ratio's sensitivity to our model choice, we calibrate the Leland & Toft (1996) model and calculate RARs and IRARs, where the structural model by Leland & Toft (1996) incorporates bankruptcy costs, tax advantages for issuing debt and endogenous default boundary. 42 We …nd that the Spearman rank correlation between the RARs (IRARs) inferred from the Merton (1974) model and the Leland & Toft (1996) model is 0.963 (0.955) emphasizing that our results are highly insensitive to the model choice.
43
Similarly, the debt governance proxies are likely to be noisy measures. We further experiment with alternative measures by counting up covenants directly addressing corporate actions that are likely to be used in risk shifting -covenant restricting leverage increase, investment, mergers. This measure, which we term as Jrisk, is highly correlated with Cov_J. When we use it in place of Cov_J in all regression analysis, we …nd qualitatively similar results. However, the statistical signi…cance is reduced in some cases, suggesting those covenants we exclude from Jrisk measure might play an indirect role in mitigating risk shifting. Tables for these results are available upon request.
Lastly, we experiment with di¤erent de…nition of our control variables, to further ensure the robustness of the results. The results are robust with respect to using book or market leverage, and are insensitive to using the original controls of Fang & Zhong (2004) and Larsen (2006) , or an expanded set of controls including those in Coles et al. (2006) .
Conclusion
We investigate the impact of debt governance on …rms' risk shifting behavior. Using newly constructed …rm-level covenant indices as debt governance proxies, and market-based estimates of asset risk using Moody's KMV algorithm, we …nd that stronger debt governance is associated with (2006) we use a tax rate of 20% which re ‡ects the personal bene…ts of equity returns. The bankruptcy costs are 15% which lies within the range estimated by Andrade & Kaplan (1998) . As the asset payout rate we follow Huang & Huang (2003) and use 6 percent and consistent with Stohs & Mauer (1996) we use an average debt maturity of 3.38 years lower risk shifting. This e¤ect mainly exists among …rms that are close to …nancial distress. The mitigating e¤ect on risk shifting due to strong debt governance is economically meaningful. For example, among …rms with high default probabilities, strong debt governance is associated with a 25% reduction in industry-adjusted asset risk from the previous period. We further investigate the role of debt governance in mitigating the e¤ect of managerial risktaking incentives on risk shifting. Indeed, we …nd that, in the presence of strong debt governance, the positive e¤ect on risk shifting of high managerial risk-taking incentives, measured by the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility, is largely eliminated. A caveat, however, is that this result appears to be sensitive to the de…nition of the debt governance proxies. Relating debt governance to the e¤ect of Vega on the credit spreads of the bonds issued by the …rm, we …nd that the impact of Vega on credit spreads is a function of the strength of debt governance. Bondholders generally view high Vega negatively when debt governance is weak. With strong debt governance, however, credit spreads are negatively associated with Vega.
Findings in this study raise at least two questions. First, by documenting that debt governance reduces risk shifting by mitigating the impact of managerial risk-taking incentives, we leave open the question of whether the resulting risk taking level is one step closer to the optimal level of …rm risk. Furthermore, what is the value implication of the documented e¤ect on the …rm risk? Under the "nexus of contracts" view in Jensen & Meckling (1976) , these questions can't be approached without considering the interactions among di¤erent governance mechanisms designed for di¤erent claimholders.
A Appendix: The Merton model
The Merton (1974) model is given as,
where the value of a …rm's assets V is lognormal and follows a geometric Brownian motion process dV = ( V V )V dt + V V dW V with an instantaneous drift V . V is the fraction of the …rm's assets paid out to bondholders and equityholders, V is the instantaneous asset volatility, and W V is a standard Brownian motion. D is the face value debt with maturity date T , and r is the riskfree interest rate. d 
C Appendix: Computation of Delta and Vega Measures
We use the approximation method by Guay (1999) and Core & Guay (2002) to compute Delta (the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price) and Vega (the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock volatility). The information on option-based compensation is obtained from Execucomp that provides data on new grants, unexercisable, and exercisable options. Execucomp provides su¢ cient information to compute Delta and Vega for new grants, whereas we need to rely on the Core & Guay (2002) approximation method to compute the incentive measures for all outstanding unexercisable and exercisable options.
We follow Core & Guay (2002) and estimate an average strike price and time to maturity for unexercisable and exercisable options. The average strike price is (year-end stock price realizable value/number of options), where the realizable value is the potential gain from exercising all outstanding options. The time to maturity of exercisable options is either equal to three years less the life of the current year's option grants or six years if the …rm made no option grants in the current year. The time to maturity of unexercisable options is either equal to one year less the life of current year's option grants or nine years if the …rm made no option grants the current year.
The total dollar values of Delta and Vega from the option portfolio inferred from the BlackScholes-Merton model are given as,
where j denotes option characteristics of (1) new grants, (2) unexercisable options and (3) exercisable options. n tj denotes the number of options for group j, S is the expected annual dividend rate over the life of the option, T j is time to maturity for options in group j (in years), S t is the current stock price, K j is the strike price of options in group j, r is the continuous risk-free interest rate, S is the annualized stock return volatility, IRAR (the industry-adjusted risk adjustment ratio) is equal to the di¤erence between the risk adjustment ratio (RAR) and the median RAR of the …rms in the same 2-digit SIC coded industry and in the same year, where RAR is the ratio between the current and the next year's asset volatility.
Cov_J is the value-weighted covenant J-Index value.
Cov_W is the value-weighted covenant W-Index value.
Scale_J is a scaled covenant protection measure which equals the Cov_J value in a given …rm year divided by the maximum value of Cov_J. The same applies for the covenant W-Index (Scale_W).
Cov_J_quar i is an indicator variable equal to one if the …rm in a given year has a Cov_J value in the i quartile, where i = 2; 3 and 4. The same applies for the covenant W-Index (Cov_W_quar i ).
Cov_J_h is an indicator variable equal to one if the …rm in a given year has a Cov_J value above the median Cov_J. The same applies for the covenant W-Index (Cov_W_h).
DP denotes the default probability inferred from the Merton (1974) model.
DP_quar4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the …rm in a given year is in the upper default probability quartile. DP*Scale_J is the cross product between DP and Scale_J. The same applies for the covenant W-Index (DP*Scale_W).
DP_quar4*Cov_J_h is an indicator variable equal to one if the …rm in a given year is in the upper default quartile and has a Cov_J value above the median covenant index value. The same applies for the covenant W-Index (DP_quar4*Cov_W_h).
Delta is the change in the dollar value of the executive's wealth for a one-percentage point change in stock price. A more detailed description is provided in Appendix C.
Vega is the change in the dollar value of the executive's wealth for a one-percentage point change in the annualized standard deviation of description is provided in Appendix C.
Vega_quar4 is an indicator variable equal to one if the executives in a given year have a Vega value greater than the upper risk incentive quartile. 
